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STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action by the plaintiff for injuries sus-
tained arising out of an automobile accident on or about 
March 17, 1971, northwest of Green River, Utah on U. S. 
Highways 50 & 6. Defendant denied liability on the basis 
of unavoidable accident or plaintiffs contributory negli-
gence. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The Case was tried to a jury. From a verdict and 
judgment in favor of the plaintiff and against the de-
fendant, the defendant appeals. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant seeks for reversal of the judgment granted 
in the lower court by reason of the lower court's in-
advertence, or mistake, or failure to give the defendant's 
requested instructions relative to defendant's theory of 
the case, namely the trial court failed to give the re-
quested instructions relative to an unavoidable accident 
and J.I.F.U. Instruction 2.5., which defined what acts 
of the plaintiff constituted contributory negligence, 
while giving as Instruction No. 5, what acts of the de-
fendant constituted negligence. Defendant asserts that 
this failure gave the Jury an undue emphasis on Plain-
tiff's theory of the case and no real assistance in apply-
ing defendant's theory. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
That on or about March 27,1971, the plaintiff and de-
fendant were traveling in separate cars from West to 
East on U. S. Highways 50 and 6. The weather was 
clear but windy. The roads were dry. At a point approxi-
mately 5 miles northwest of Green River, Utah, both 
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parties encountered wind storms carrying dust and 
debris. These wind storms were blowing in the same 
general direction the plaintiff and defendant w e r e 
traveling, although somewhat across the road. The plain-
tiff proceeded through a small dust storm, then into a 
large dust storm at which time she immediately sloweH 
her vehicle speed to five miles per hour. The defendant 
was a sufficient distance behind the plaintiff's vehicle 
as to be unaware of its presence on the road and had not 
seen plaintiff's vehicle prior to plaintiff's entry into a sec-
ond dust storm. The posted highway speed was 70 miles 
per hour, and the defendant had been traveling between 
65 and 70 miles per hour. Defendant entered the first 
dust storm and as quickly as he cleared the same, he 
became aware that another storm was in front of him. 
The distance between the two storms was only a matter 
of a few hundred feet. The defendant began to deceler-
ate, turned on special lights and entered the storm. 
Immediately, he saw the brake lights of the plaintiff's 
vehicle and applied his own brakes. The distance was 
not sufficient for him to come to a stop and avoid the 
accident. At approximately 11:45 a.m. defendant's ve-
hicle collided with the plaintiff's vehicle, propelling the 
plaintiff's vehicle forward into a third vehicle. The 
plaintiff's vehicle caught on fire. The plaintiff's husband, 
a passenger, was killed in the accident. The plaintiff 
was apparently unconscious and the defendant dragged 
the plaintiff from her burning vehicle. The plaintiff 
claims to be free of any contributory negligence. The 
defendant claims that he had no opportunity to prevent 
the accident having had insufficient notice of the plain-
tiff's presence in order to bring his vehicle to a stop 
prior to the accident, or that the plaintiff failed to give 
the defendant sufficient notice of the presence of the 
plaintiff's vehicle so as to avoid the accident. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE LOWER COURT, BY FAILING TO GIVE 
THE DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED JURY INSTRUC-
TIONS, FAILED TO PRESENT TO THE JURY, IN A 
C L E A R AND UNDERSTANDING MANNER, THE 
PRINCIPLES OF LAW APPLICABLE TO THIS CASE. 
The Jury, as the trier of the fact, was instructed by 
the court as to what the law was. As laymen, the jury 
relies heavily upon the court's instructions in order to 
know how to proceed. While there were relatively few 
material differences in the testimony as to how the acci-
dent occurred, there is a great difference of opinion as 
to how the facts should be interpreted. For this court 
to understand defendant's theory of the case and defend-
ant's grievance by reason of the lower court's failure 
to give the requested instructions, it is necessary to 
detail the factual situation involved. 
There were three drivers of vehicles, a passenger 
^nd a highway patrolman who testified as to the accident 
during the trial. 
The first driver was Mr. Bates of the Utah Fish and 
Game Department. He was traveling from Woodside 
to Green River for lunch. The other two drivers were 
the plaintiff and defendant. All three drivers agreed 
that prior to the dust storm, it had been dry and clear 
(Transcript, p. 39, line 23; p. 90, lines 9 -11 ; p. 303, lines 
4 -8 ) . Mr. Bates testified that he had passed the plain-
tiff's vehicle immediately prior to entering the dust 
storm (Ibid., p. 38, lines 28 - 30; p. 48, lines 5-16). This 
was the first dust storm that Bates had seen on the day 
in question. Bates testified that even up to one-half mile 
prior to the second storm he was traveling approximately 
65 miles per hour (Ibid., p. 48, lines 9-16). Upon enter-
ing the dust storm, the passenger in the Bates vehicle, 
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Stevens, testified that Bates almost collided with the 
rear end of another vehicle (Ibid., p. 53, lines 21 - 28) 
because of the intensity of the storm. Bates testified 
that he could barely see the tail lights in front of him 
(Ibid., p. 40, line 6; p. 46, lines 24 - 28) and that he "could 
crawl along on the highway" (Ibid., p. 46, line 17). Bates 
and his passenger were both also aware of the fact that 
another vehicle was behind them since they had just 
passed it, so Bates continued to watch for it in his rear 
view mirror (Ibid., p. 39, line 28; p. 53, lines 14 -15). 
The second driver was the plaintiff. Prior to the 
accident the plaintiff had been traveling approximately 
55-60 miles an hour (Ibid., p. 278, lines 14 - 15) when she 
was passed by the Fish and Game vehicle. She testified 
that she had gone through one dust storm which passed 
quickly and could then see a second dust storm (Ibid., 
p. 92, lines 12 - 17). The plaintiff reluctantly admitted 
that when she entered the second dust storm, she felt 
that it would also pass quickly (Ibid., p. 279, lines 14 - 29). 
Nevertheless, because of the density of the storm, she 
slowed her speed to approximately five miles per hour. 
Because the Fish and Game vehicle had passed her, she 
knew of the presence of that vehicle and obviously was 
on guard for the same. The plaintiff, Mrs. Stringham, 
testified that she "could not see ahead of me, only just 
the hood of my car." (Ibid., p. 279, line 18). She was in 
the storm approximately five minutes, moving 5 miles 
per hour, when the accident occurred (Ibid-., p. 93, lines 
6 and 21; p. 280, lines 21 - 22). The defendant stated that 
she slowed her speed to five miles an hour "because I 
didn't know how far ahead of me this other car was" 
(Ibid., p. 93, lines 6 and 7). 
The defendant was the third driver. While we do 
not know how far the defendant was behind the other 
two vehicles, we know that he was traveling between 
65 and 70 miles per hour, and it was approximately 5 
minutes after the plaintiff entered the second storm, 
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that the accident occurred. Thus it would seem that 
the defendant was approximately 4 to 5 miles west of 
the plaintiff when she entered the second dust storm. 
The defendant had passed through a small dust storm 
(Ibid., p. 304, lines 8 -13) , when he observed the second 
storm, which was about 100 yards east of the first storm. 
The defendant decelerated at that point and entered the 
second storm. At the count of 1, 2, 3, the defendant ob-
served the brake lights of the plaintiff (Ibid., p. 304, 
lines 20 - 22). The defendant immediately applied his 
brakes (Ibid., p. 304, lines 26 - 27) but was unable to 
avoid the accident. The defendant had neither prior 
warning nor knowledge of the presence of either the ve-
hicle driven by Bates or the plaintiff's vehicle prior to 
entering the second storm. The highway patrolman in-
vestigating the accident testified that the storm extended 
into Green River (which was at least five miles east of 
the accident, and perhaps beyond, but was unable to 
identify how far east or west the storm extended (Ibid., 
p. 19, lines 28 - 30; p. 20, lines 5 - 7.) However, all of 
the drivers testified that the storm did not extend very 
far west of the scene of the accident. 
This court has recognized that there are cases where 
the facts warrant giving an instruction on unavoidable 
accidents. (See Porter v. Price, 11 Utah 2d 80, 355 P. 2d 
66, 68; and Wellman v. Noble, 12 Utah 2d 350, 366 P. 2d 
701.) In the Wellman case the court noted that in most 
eases such an instruction is superfulous. However, due 
to the fact situation involved in this appeal, the defend-
ant urges this court to concur with a statement made by 
the trial judge before he inadvertently omitted giving 
defendant's requested instruction relative to unavoidable 
accidents and J.I.F.U. Instruction 2.5. At that time, the 
trial judge said, "I think that I shall give an instruction 
on contributory negligence and also on unavoidable 
accident and let them mull both of those over" (Op. Cit., 
p. 332, lines 29 & 30; p. 333, line 1). However, due to 
some confusion at the time the court gave its instruc-
5 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
tions, both of those instructions were overlooked, which 
oversight was acknowledged by the trial court to coun-
sel, and request was made by the trial court to give 
that instruction to the jury after the oversight was ascer-
tained. However, plaintiff's counsel strongly resisted 
that suggestion, so the error was not corrected. The 
confusion referred to is as follows: The trial court orig-
inally reserved two days for the trial of the matter. In 
compliance with that understanding, the defendant sub-
poenaed a witness by the name of Helen Hurst to be 
and appear at 2:00 p.m. on Thursday, February 14, 1974, 
which was the second day of the trial, to testify for and 
in behalf of the defendant. However, the testimony of 
the medical experts took longer than was anticipated 
and expected so the trial was not completed on the 
second day, and the defendant was unable to call Mrs. 
Hurst at the time she was subpoenaed. Mrs. Hurst was 
scheduled to be at a wedding at Manti on the morning 
of Friday, February 15, 1974, and by leave of the court, 
she was allowed to go to Manti for the wedding cere-
mony. It was anticipated by defendant's counsel that 
the witness would be available for testimony at 2:00 p.m. 
on Friday, February 15, 1974. However, the witness did 
not appear at the appointed time, and after short delay 
the defendant was required to rest his case. The trial 
judge then proceeded to give the jury instructions (Ibid., 
pgs. 335 & 336). Prior to the conclusion of the instructions, 
the defendant's witness, Mrs. Hurst, appeared to testify. 
The defendant requested, and, over the objection of the 
plaintiff, leave was granted by the court for the defend-
ant to reopen his case and allow Mrs. Hurst to testify 
(Ibid., pgs. 336 - 338). Although it does not appear in 
the transcript of the trial, thereafter, the court noted 
its own error in failing to give the instructions requested 
by the defendant relative to his theory, namely J.I.F.U. 
Instruction 2.5., and the instruction relative to unavoid-
able accident, namely, J.I.F.U. Instruction 16.1. Defend-
ant's counsel requested the court to give the instructions 
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to the Jury at that time (which was prior to the argu-
ment of counsel). The plaintiff's counsel insisted that 
for the trial court to do so would be to give too much 
emphasis to defendant's theory of the case and would 
be reversible error. Based upon the arguments of the 
plaintiff, the trial judge did not give the defendant's 
requested instructions and directed both counsel to 
argue their theories to the jury based only on the instruc-
tions that had previously been given the Jury as to the 
law in the matter. 
f" Defendant asserts and woi ilci urge this Court to 
find that this particular fact stituation is one in which 
the trial court should have given the requested instruc-
tion relative to unavoidable accident. The facts show 
defendant had no warning of the presence of the plain-
tiff's vehicle until he was on it. The paintiff's brake 
lights were on, indicating she was stopping on the road-
way. Even the plaintiff could not see past her hood. The 
dust was rolling in. While the plaintiff was aware of 
and knew of vehicles in front of her the defendant had 
no such knowledge. As regretable as the accident was, 
there was nothing a reasonable and prudent man could 
have done to avoid the accident. The non-party driver, 
Bates, did not slow his vehicle below 65 miles per hour 
until he was nearly in the storm, which indicates that he 
was not apprehensive until he was in the storm. The de-
fendant started decelerating as he approached the storm, 
but found himself on to the plaintiff's vehicle too soon 
to stop. The defendant's conduct was not a great deal 
different from that of Bates, except he found plaintiff's 
vehicle nearly stopped in front of him, with brake lights 
glowing. If the plaintiff was in the storm for five min-
utes, t r a i l i n g five miles per hour, she traveled approxi-
mately '**H9 feet from the west edge of the second storm, 
into the storm. The defendant, during that same period, 
traveled at least four and probably closer to five miles 
through the small storm and then into the s e c o n d 
storm. The plaintiff and defendant both felt that the 
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second storm would pass quickly. Neither party expected 
the storm to be as dense as it was. The plaintiff practi-
cally came to a stop, and the defendant, not knowing of 
the presence of the plaintiff's vehicle, accidentally col-
lided with that vehicle. If ever a fact situtation would 
justify a jury instruction regarding an unavoidable ac-
cident, it would seem that this case would be the perfect 
one. -•": 
Not withstanding appellant's urging this Court to 
find that the trial court should have given the instruc-
tion relative to a unavoidable accident, if this court 
should find against your appellant regarding the same, 
appellant would urge that a new trial should be ordered 
for failure to give requested J.I.F.U. Instruction 2.5. 
Defendant asserts that the trial court, by giving the 
plaintiff's requested Instruction No. 5, relative to the 
duty of the defendant to the plaintiff and thus what 
constituted negligence, and by failing to give the de-
fendant's requested J.I.F.U. Instruction 2.5., relative to 
the duty of the plaintiff to the defendant and thus 
defining what actually constitutes contributory negli-
gence, was and is reversible error. Your appellant asserts, 
that without the requested instruction the jury was un-
able to accurately and correctly ascertain and apply 
the law in question. Subsequent to the jury verdict, as 
the parties were leaving the court house, the defendant's 
counsel was approached by six members of the jury who 
informed him that the only reason they had reached a 
verdict in favor the plaintiff and against the defendant 
was that when Instruction No. 5 was read in the jury 
room, which instruction clearly defined the defendant's 
duty to the plaintiff, and when the jury could find no 
instruction which defined the plaintiff's duties to the 
defendant, the jury felt it had no alternative but to find 
in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant, even 
though the six jurors felt the accident could not be 
avoided. By reason of those representations, defendant's 
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counsel subsequently prepared identical affidavits to 
that effect for the jurors, which were duly executed by 
five of the jurors and submitted to the trial court, to-
gether with a motion for a new trial, which motion was 
subsequently denied. Those affidavits were requested 
to be transmitted to this Court as a part of the record. 
Appellant draws this court's attention to said affidavits 
for the purpose of demonstrating that the instructions 
given the jury were not correctly presented in that the 
instructions were neither clear nor understandable to 
the jury and thus caused the jury to misapply the same. 
Appellant thus asserts that the trial court's failure to 
give the requested instructions at the time requested 
was and is reversible error which caused the jury to be 
unable to correctly apply the law in a clear and under-
atandable manner. 
POINT II 
THE DEFENDANT IS ENTITLED TO THE SAME 
BENEFIT OF PROPER JURY INSTRUCTION AS WAS 
AFFORDED TO THE PLAINTIFF. FAILURE TO GIVE 
SAID INSTRUCTION IS REVERSIBLE ERROR. 
It is the settled rule of this court that each party is 
entitled to have its theory of the case presented to the 
jury so long as the facts are sufficient to substantiate 
the same. The defendant acknowledges that the trial 
court gave general instructions relative to negligence 
and contributory negligence. However, the trial court 
explicitly defined what acts of the defendant would 
constitute negligence on the part of the defendant in 
Instruction No. 5, but neglected to give at the request of 
the defendant J.I.F.U. Instruction 2.5., which would 
have set forth with particularity the duties of the plain-
tiff to the defendant and thus the acts of the plaintiff 
which would have constituted contributory negligence. 
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A case which appears to be close in its facts to the 
instant case is that of Flippen v. Mil ward (120 Utah 373, 
234 P. 2d 1053 (1953)) where the defendant's automobile 
rear-ended the plaintiff's automobile in a dense fog. The 
Court in affirming a verdict for the defendant stated 
that the instructions regarding plaintiff's duty to use a 
stop light signal were proper. By the same reasoning it 
would seem that the trial court's failure to give defend-
ants requested instruction regarding the plaintiff's duty 
to the defendant would be improper, and therefore re-
versible. 
Defendant accepts the well established rule of law 
that the jury instructions must be considered in their 
entirety along with all other instructions (See Simpson 
v. General Motors Corp., 470 P. 2d 399, 24 Utah 2d 301 
(1970)). Also Enell and Son, Inc. v. Salt Lake City Corp., 
493, P. 2d 1283, 27 Utah 2d 188, (1972)). However, in 
considering all of the instructions together, the defend-
ant asserts that undue emphasis was given to the plain-
iff's theory of the case and that equal emphasis was not 
given to the defentant's theory of the case, which fact 
caused the jury to be confused and to inappropriately 
apply the law in question as is witnessed by their swQrn 
affidavits. 
SUMMARY 
Defendant contends that a new trial should be 
ordered by this court directing that the trial court shall 
give jury instructions consistent with the defendant's 
theory of the case and that are harmonious with the 
facts. Undue emphasis should not be given to either the 
plaintiff's or defendant's theories, but the instructions 
should be fair, clear and understandable, so that the jury 
can correctly apply the law to the facts as they shall 
find them. 
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